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I. Introduction
This is an investment analysis report on TransDigm Group Incorporated (TDG), which is a manufacturing 
company that designs, produces and distributes aircraft components in the United States. We are 
writing this report to clarify why TDG stock is worth investing in the public market. TDG has 
compounded its return in the past three years, and we believe it should continue to generate 
meaningful returns. We recommend to buy TDG stocks based upon three key reasons: (1) TDG's moat 
should drive future organic EBITDA growth; (2) TDG's track record of making intelligent acquisitions 
should drive inorganic returns; and (3) TDG's capital allocation policies should magnify returns even 
further. In this report, we'll introduce its business segments, explain the above mentioned three 
investment thesis, dig into its management team and conduct valuation analysis.
TDG operates through three segments: Power & Control, Airframe and Non-aviation. The Power & 
Control segment produces power or power control components for aircrafts, like electronic, fluid, power 
and motion control products. The Airframe segment provides non-power airframe products and cabin 
structure technologies. The Non-aviation segment provides seat belts and safety restraints for ground 
transportation and electro-mechanical actuators for space applications. The primary clients include 
commercial airline operators, third party maintenance suppliers, military buying agencies, and repair 
depots. TransDigm Group Incorporated was founded in 1993 and is based in Cleveland, Ohio1.
1.1 Business Description
Most analysts frame Transdigm by its end-market exposure in two key segments: OEM and Aftermarket.
Like many aerospace businesses, TDG sells OEM parts to Boeing or Airbus at a fairly low margin, but 
makes extremely high margins on the steady stream of aftermarket or "spare" parts. OEMs typically 
manufacture a plane for a cycle of 25 -  30 years, and then planes fly for 25 -  30 years, leading to a total 
selling window of 50 -  60 years for TDG components.
The OEM end-market segment delivers mission critical parts to key airline manufacturers (think Boeing, 
Airbus, but also some military contracts as well). This is a bit of a cyclical business but still high margin. 
The cyclicality actually comes from incremental orders, e.g. the airline cycle / new plane orders. Pre­
existing contracts are very long-term in nature (think 15 to 20 years or more), allowing some measure of 
underlying stability.
More interesting is the Aftermarket end-market. The Aftermarket distributes mission critical parts to 
planes that need parts as part of an ordinary maintenance. FAA regulations actually prohibit planes from 
taking off if they don't possess these 'mission critical' parts2. Because 90%+ of TDG's products are
1 'Transdigm Group Inc. Profile," Reuters, accessed August 6, 2017,
http://in.reuters.eom/finance/stocks/companvProfile7svmbohTDG.N.
2 "A Comparison of DOD and Commercial Airline Purchasing Practices," United States General Accounting Office, 
accessed November 1999, http://www.gao.gov/assets/230/228420.pdf.
proprietary and they are the sole provider of 80%+ of their products, this is an incredibly stable business. 
We believe the Aftermarket end-channel is the 'source' of TDG's high margins.
The mix and growth rate of both the Aftermarket and OEM3 end market channels are shown below -
Aftermarket and OEM YoY % Revenue Growth and Total 
Revenue Contribution
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Yet the OEM and Aftermarket are not two separate businesses, they are linked: in order to access the 
Aftermarket, one must make big up front investments and defer returns through the long OEM phase. 
This reinforces the stickiness of TDG's 'mission critical parts.
What are these mission critical parts? They range from batteries to seatbelts. In fact, if you ever noticed 
on the seatbelt logo when you flew on a plane, they are made by the same TDG owned firm: AmSafe. 
Some of these mission critical parts are shown4 below -
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3 Commercial OEM is ~ 70% while the remaining 30% is Defense OEM.
4 "2016 Analyst Day Presentation," Transdigm Group Inc.,
ftp://www.tra nsdigm.com/phoenix.zhtm I ?c=196053&p=irol-presentations.
Transdigm sells these mission critical parts not just in the U.S.5 but globally. And foreign sales have 
approached 1/3 of the business over the past several years -
Revenue Growth and Mix by Geography
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How did TDG come to accumulate such a broad portfolio of products? The answer resides in a history of 
acquisitions as shown below -
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Including DDC, TransDigm has acquired 57 businesses 
since 1993, including 42 since its IPO.
In fact, we actually went through each of TDG's historical acquisitions including what they paid and who 
was the seller (e.g. was it a strategic or financial seller). But perhaps more interesting is that TDG's 
acquisitions in themselves fit into a myriad of 26 business units.
While these acquisitions certainly have contributed to overall growth of the business, they also don't' 
distract from the firm's underlying stability which contributes to roughly 3% to 5% in organic growth -
5 While TDG does manufacture a significant portion of their products in the U.S., they also manufacture some 
products in Belgium, China, Germany, Hungary, Malaysia, Mexico, Norway, Sri Lanka, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, and even Singapore. 'TDG FY'15 10-K," Edgar, p. 4 -  5,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1260221/000126022115000013/tdg2015-09x3Q10k.htm
These acquisitions have also helped TDG sustain fairly high incremental margin contributions (40%+):
TDG Incremental Margin Contributions
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Which have corresponded to EBITDA margins in the high 40% range -
And considering the asset light nature of the business, CapEx is often less than 2.5% of sales -
Which in turn has produced a high degree of Cash Conversion for the business -
Cash Conversion (OCF as a % of Net Income)
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Each of these acquisitions fall into the reported business segments of which there are three: Power & 
Control, Airframe, and Non-Aviation. Each segment's contribution to total revenues is shown below -
TDG Revenue Breakdown (in mm of USD)
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We will discuss each of these segments briefly starting with Power & Control.
II. Business Segments
2.1 Power & Control Segment
The Power & Control segment commands almost 50% of Revenues and 55% of EBITDA. The segment 
primarily develops, produces, and market systems and components that predominately provide power 
to or control power of the aircraft utilizing electronic, fluid, power and mechanical motion control 
technologies.
As such, this department produces power or power control components for aircrafts, like electronic, 
fluid, power and motion control parts, power conditioning devices, specialized AC/DC6 electric motors 
and generators and cargo loading and handling systems.
The primary customers of this segment are engine and power system suppliers, airlines, third party 
maintenance suppliers, military buying agencies and repair depots. Products are sold in the OEM and 
aftermarket end markets.7
The segment historically has grown fairly healthy with organic growth amounting to ~ 6% to 7% of total 
revenue growth -
Naturally, the segment also possesses high incremental margin contributions that on average, are 40%+:
6 Alternating Currents / Direct Currents. Direct Current goes in one direction and is often associated with a battery 
(think of a flashlight). In contrast, Alternative Current can go both directions such as a kitchen appliance that's 
plugged into a residential home.
7 "Transdigm Group Inc. Profile," Reuters, accessed August 6,2017,
http://in.reuters.eom/finance/stocks/companvProfile7svmboNTDG.N.
As such, the Power & Control Segment tends to command healthy EBITDA margins of 46%+:
Power & Control % EBITDA Margins
54.0%
2.2 Airframe Segment
The Airframe segment represents about 47% of sales and 50% of total EBITDA. The segment provides 
non-power airframe products and cabin structure technologies. Major product offerings include 
engineered latching and locking devices, engineered connectors and elastomers, cockpit security 
components and systems, aircraft audio systems, specialized lavatory components, seat belts and safety 
restraints, engineered interior surfaces and related components, lighting and control technology, and 
cargo delivery systems8.
Because most incremental acquisitions have gone towards the Power & Control segment, revenue 
growth here has been lower but still trends 10%+. Organic Growth has trended around mid-to-high 
single digit growth:
s "Transdigm Group Inc. Profile, " Reuters, accessed August 6, 2017, 
http://in.reuters.eom/finance/stocks/companvProfile7svmbohTDG.N.
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Like the Power & Control segment, incremental margin contributions are incredibly high for this 
business -
Which has naturally resulted in fairly robust EBITDA margins for the Airframe segment -
2.3 Non-Aviation Segment
The last segment is the Non-Aviation Segment. This segment is incredibly small, making up less than 4% 
of total sales and roughly 2% of total firm EBITDA. As such, we won't spend much time here. As the 
name implies, the Non-Aviation segment includes operations that primarily develop, produce and 
market products for Non-Aviation markets.
Major product offerings include seat belts and safety restraints for ground transportation applications, 
electro-mechanical actuators and controls for space applications, and refueling systems for heavy 
equipment in mining and construction. Primary clients include off-road vehicle suppliers, child restraint 
system suppliers, satellite and space system suppliers and manufacturers of heavy equipment, 
construction and other industries9.
It's fortunate that this segment is small as both revenue growth and EBITDA margins are far lower than 
the other two segments, which is due to TDG's management not pursuing any acquisitions here. Total 
organic growth did have some headwinds several years ago but has since been on upswing due to the 
cyclicality of the end markets served -
9"Transdigm Group Inc. Profile, " Reuters, accessed August 6, 2017, 
http://in.reuters.com/finance/stocks/companvProfile?svmbol=TDG.N.
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We think the lack of acquisitions makes sense in the context of this segment's lower EBITDA margins -
III. Investment Thesis
3.1 Thesis Point 1: TDG's Moat Should Drive Future Organic EBITDA Growth
If you glanced at the myriad of charts before, you'd notice that FY'15 was a bit of a 'rough patch' for 
TDG. This was actually due to some softness in the private jet market coupled the general airline cycle 
(airline cycles tend to occur every 7 years). The end result was a slowdown in bookings and an 
interruption to historically high FCF growth as shown below -
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These headwinds ignored what is an otherwise incredibly stable business. Let us explain -
TDG's products are mission critical parts for airplanes. Because FAA and international regulations 
preclude planes from departing with these critical parts, there's a bit of stability and inherent demand.10
More interesting, TDG does not products that are tailored to a customer's exact specifications. That's 
because they have intellectual property which they vigorously defend. These proprietary products -  
which comprise ~90% of their offerings -  are much higher margin. When combined the fact that TDG is 
the sole supplier of ~80% of its offerings, this creates a powerful competitive dynamic.
10 "A Comparison of DOD and Commercial Airline Purchasing Practices," United States General Accounting Office, 
accessed November 1999, http://www.gao.gov/assets/230/228420.pdf.
But we can dig even deeper. It turns out that TDG's parts are actually a low part of the overall cost 
structure for airplanes. To make an airplane costs hundreds of thousands of dollars. Yet ASP's for TDG 
can range from $500 to $5,000 while some other products are even $10,000. But this is still cheap 
relative to the entire budget meaning TDG can get away with increasing prices. Spare parts are a minor 
expense for airlines compared to Fuel and Personnel. And when OEMs seek to drive cost cuts they target 
bigger items like engines.
Even the Department Of Defense11 admits they have very little negotiating leverage and typically accept 
the offered price. While there have been challenges to 'price increases' in some industries lately, we 
think there's a nuance with TDG.
• First, airline manufacturers don't have the same public sympathy as individuals that have 
increasingly high medical expenditures;
• Second, most manufacturers are reluctant to switch;
• Third, the price increases, on average, are roughly 5% to 7%, which is far tamer than increasing 
50%+ per year.
Taken together, we think that assuming at 5% to 7% top-line organic growth is sensible. In fact, if we 
ignore the FY'15 headwinds, we can see that organic revenue growth is reflective of those price 
increases -
Year Ended Septem ber 30, 2015 2016
U SD  in millions, except per share and per unit data 2011 2012 2013 2014 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2015 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
O raanic & In o raan ic  % G row th  C ontribu tion
P ow er &  Contro l O rgan ic  G row th
Commercial OEM NA 2.2% 0.5% 0.9°/o NA -1.4% 1.1% NA -3.0% -0.6% 0.1%
Commercial A lter Market NA 0.7% 1.7% 3.4% NA 1.8% -0.7% NA -2.3% 4.3% 5.6%
Defense NA 4.5% -2.3% 1.8% NA 2.1% 1.6% 2.0% 0.0% -2.5% 1.7%
Total Power & Control Organic Growth NA 7.5% -0.1% 6.1% 3.4°/o 2.4% 2.1%' 2.8%V -5.4% 1.2% 7.3%
Total Power & Control Inorganic Growth NA 7.5% 9.0% 16.6% 0.0% 0.0% 15.4%' 11.7%’ 27.9%' 37.6%' 10.3%’
Total Power & Control Revenue Growth NA 16.1%' 21.9%' 22.7% 3.4% 3.0%' 17.5% 14.5% 22.5% 38.8% 17.6%
A irfram e O rgan ic  G row th
Commercial OEM NA 9.1% 5.9% 4.1% NA NA -1.0% 1.1% 1.5% 0.5% 4.5%
Commercial After Market NA 3.8% -1.2% 6.6% NA NA 2.1% 3.0% 1.6% 5.2% 3.7%
Defense NA 2.9% 1.8% 1.2% NA NA 3.2% -0.1%’ -0.3% 1.6% 1.4%
Total Airframe Organic Growth NA 15.8% 6.5% 11.9% 2.4% 4.0%" 4.3% 4.0% 2.5% ^ 7.2% 9 7%
Total Airframe Inorganic Growth NA 51.2% 9.8% 15.1% 19.1% 3.0% 0.6%' 10.8%’ 15.1% 13.4%' 4.2%'
Total Airframe Revenue Growth NA 67.0% 4.0%' 27.2%' 21.5% 7.0% 10.9% 14.8% 17.6% 20.7%' 13.9%
Non-Aviation O rgan ic  G row th
Commercial OEM NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.6%' NA NA NA
Commercial After Market NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Defense NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Total Non-Aviation Organic Growth NA NA -13.7% -7.9% 0.8% 6.8% 7.2% NA
Total Non-Aviation Inorganic Growth NA NA 38.6% 2.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% NA
Total Non-Aviation Revenue Growth NA NA 25.4%' -5.1% 0.8% 6.8% 7.2% 3.7%
Total Firm G rowth
Commercial OEM NA 6.6% 3.0% 2.6% 1.7% 0.2% 0.0% 0.7% -0.7% 0.2% 2.3%
Commercial After Market NA 2.5% 0.2% 4.7% 2.0% 2.5% 0.7% 1.6% -0.4% 4.6% 4.5%
Defense NA 9 ^ ------ -------- J-4% -0.7% 0.7% 2.3% 1.3% -0.2% __ Q W * --
Total Organic Growth NA C L j l 6 % ' 5 2% 3.0% 3.4% 3 .0 % ' 3.5% -1.2% 4.3% 8 d 2 >
Total Inorganic Growth NA 29.2% 10.9%n \ 1 5 . 2 % ’ 8.4°/£ 1.4% 10 5% 10.8%^ 2 0 .7 % / 24.3%’ 7 1%'
Total Revenue Growth NA 40.7% 16.1% 2 s^% 11.4% 4.8% 13.5% 14.3% 1 9 .§ ^ 28.6% 15.2%
Organic Growth Rate Primarily 
Comprised of 'Price Increases.'
11 "A Comparison of DOD and Commercial Airline Purchasing Practices," United States General Accounting Office, 
accessed November 1999, http://www.gao.gov/assets/230/228420.pdf.
Yet TDG's strategy doesn't stop there. TDG runs a lean ship with low OpEx. This is partially due to 
aggressive cost cutting for incremental acquisitions and in part due to CEO's Nick Howley's stake in the 
firm (more on this later).
3.2 Thesis Point 2: TDG's Track Record of Making Intelligent Acquisitions Should Drive Inorganic 
Returns
As previously mentioned, TDG has historically made intelligent acquisitions that complement its existing 
offerings. This isn't just a 'roll-up' story but rather a means for TDG to strengthen its competitive 
positioning, take advantage of scale and disciplined a cost structure, and to grow. We did go through 
every one of TDG's historical acquisitions. We noted several things -
• First, there is definitely a healthy mix of both strategic and financial sellers. We note how some 
of these sellers have done multiple deals with TDG. While other sellers benefitted as both a 
buyer and seller by virtue of being on TDG's board. For example, Berkshire Partners is on the 
Board of TDG. Berkshire benefited from a sale of another of their portfolio companies (AmSafe) 
back in 2012.12
• These acquisitions are almost entirely paid for in cash though the firm will issue debt and use 
the proceeds to make incremental acquisitions.
• Most of the acquisitions tilt towards Power & Control though there is an occasional Airframe 
acquisition.
We took several approaches to evaluate the return on the acquisitions themselves. One simple 
approach was to compare Operating Cash Flows per dollar amount of acquisition dollars spent -
Y e a r  E n d e d  S e p t e m b e r  30, 201 5 2016
U S D  in  m illio n s , e x c e p t p e r  s h a re  a n d  p e r  u n it  d a ta 2011 2012 2 013 2014 Q1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 201 6 Q1 Q 2 Q 3  Q 4
O p e r a t in g  C a s h  F lo w s 2 6 0 .4 4 1 3 .9 4 7 0 .2 5 4 1 .2 189 .0 (6 .0 ) 191.1 146 .9 5 2 0 .9 164.1 105 .0 1 7 5 .3  -
%  M a rg in 2 1 .6 % 2 4 .3 % 2 4 .4 % 2 2 .8 % 3 2 .2 % -1 .0 % 2 7 .6 % 1 8 .1 % 1 9 .2 % 2 3 .4 % 1 3 .2 % 2 2 .0 %
%  Y o Y  G ro w th 3 2 .0 % 5 9 .0 % 1 3 .6 % 1 5 .1 % 6 3 .3 % -1 0 5 .8 % 4 1 3 .7 % -1 2 .5 % -3 .7 % - 1 3 .1 % r 1 8 3 8 .0 % -8 .3 %
L e v e r e d  F re e  C a s h  F lo w 2 4 2 .4 3 8 8 .6 4 3 4 .7 507.1 180 .8 (2 0 .9 ) 173 .8 132 .4 466.1 154 .0 9 2 .9 1 6 7 .6  -
%  M a rg in 2 0 .1 % 2 2 .9 % 2 2 .6  % 2 1 .4 % 3 0 .8 % -3 .4 % 2 5 .1 % 1 6 .3 % 1 7 .2 % 2 1 .9 % 1 1 .7 % 2 1 .0 %
%  Y o Y  G ro w th 3 1 .4 % 6 0 .4 % 1 1 .8 % 1 6 .7 % -8 .1 % - 1 4 .9 % F 5 4 4 .4 % -3 .6 %
+ A c q u is it io n  R e la te d  E x p e n s e s (1 ,6 5 0 .4 ) (8 68 .7 ) (4 8 3 .3 ) (3 11 .9 ) (7 2 3 .2 ) (5 7 0 .3 ) (3 3 0 .8 ) (1 ,6 2 4 .3 ) (1 4 4 .4 ) (9 9 8 .6 )
L e v e r e d  F re e  C a s h  F lo w , n e t o f  A c q u is it io n s (1 ,4 0 8 .0 ) (4 80 .1 ) (4 8 .6 ) 195 .2 180 .8 (7 4 4 .1 ) (3 9 6 .5 ) (1 9 8 .4 ) (1 ,1 5 8 .2 ) 154 .0 (5 1 .5 ) (8 3 1 .0 )  -
%  Y o Y  G ro w th -7 9 8 4 % 6 5 .9 % 8 9 .9 % 5 0 1 .8 % -6 9 3 .3 % -1 4 .9 % 9 3 .1 % -1 0 9 .6 %
If we assume some lag and take a run-rate for FY'16, we are yielding a return of roughly 9% to 15%13. We 
find this 'okay' but note that the cost savings and general nature of this industry create incredible levels 
of 'lags' to the business.
12 "Berkshire Partners Announces Agreement to Sell AmSafe to TransDigm," Berkshire Partners,
http://www.berkshirepartners.com/berkshire-partners-announces-agreement-to-sell-amsafe-to-transdigm.
13 This depends on assumptions relating to the run-rate for Q4 FY'16.
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In some sense, TDG is essentially an aerospace Private Equity (PE) shop imbedded in a highly profitable 
industrial company. PE is part of the company's heritage, as TDG was PE owned from 1993 until their 
IPO in 2006. Through disciplined acquisitions TDG aims to achieve returns exceeding those of top 
quartile private equity funds while providing shareholders with the liquidity of the public markets.
TDG has structural advantages as an acquirer over traditional PE or strategic buyers:
a) Compared to PE, TDG brings deep sector expertise and the ability to save on costs through 
consolidating factories and G&A savings;
b) TDG employs the capital structure of a PE fund, enabling competitive bids versus strategic
TDG only has about 4% of the total addressable market currently, creating a very long runway for 
further M&A
a) Over the last one, three, and five year intervals cash allocated to M&A has exceeded cash flow 
from operations highlighting the array of reinvestment opportunities available; and
We think the Street doesn't model incremental M&A which tends to discount the actual NPV of TDG 
(assuming TDG can generate positive returns from incremental M&A which we think TDG can and does). 
Considering how this is part of TDG's core strategy, we don't think this can be ignored. We think this 
ignores ~ 4% to 8% in incremental inorganic EBITDA growth.14
With that said, we now turn to Thesis Point 3.
3.3 Thesis Point 3: TDG's Capital Allocation Policies Should Magnify Returns Even Further
14 This is partially based on the implied multiples paid, coupled with synergies and our own arbitrary discounting.
TDG's highly predictable cash flow stream allows it to afford a healthy dose of leverage. But we contend 
TDG takes things even further and believe that they take leverage to levels that are a rarity among 
public companies.
In fact, TDG essentially hyper-levered the business back in 2013 when they took on more debt and 
essentially were running 'net levered' as shown below -
Y e a r  Ended S ep tem b er 30, 2015 2016
U SD  in  m illions, excep t p er sha re and p er unit data 2011 2012 2013 2014 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2015 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
B A LA N C E  S H E E T
M e tric s
Net D e b t/(C ash ) 2,762.2 3,178.6 5,166.5 6,653.6 6,461.5 7,146.0 7,533.7 7,713.3 7,713.3 7,537.1 7,723.3 8,539.0
Debt / EB ITD A 5.7x 4.7x 7.Ox 7.3x 7.2x 7.2x 6.9x 6.5x 7.6x O.Ox
Net Debt / EB ITD A 5. Ox 4.1x 6.3x 6.5x r 6.6x 6.6x 6.2x 6.1x 6.4x O.Ox
A s s e ts
C a sh  a n d  C a sh  E qu iva len ts 376.2 440.5 564.7 819.5 1,011.6 392.5 915.4 714.0 714.0 805.3 612.0 1,666.7
S T  In ve s tm e n ts  /  M a rke ta b le  S e cu rit ie s
C a sh  a n d  S T  Inve s tm e n ts , ne t 376.2 440.5 564.7 819.5 1,011.6 392.5 915.4 714.0 714.0 805.3 612.0 1,666.7
Total A ssets 4,513.6 5,576.1 6,148.9 6,756.8 6,913.6 7,226.2 8,350.4 8,427.1 8,427.1 8,330.0 8,359.5 10,570.5 -
L ia b ilitie s
C urren t P o rtio n  o f  L ong -Te rm  D ebt 15.5 20.5 31.0 39.3 39.3 39.3 44.2 43.8 43.8 43.4 43.5 52.6
S T  B o rro w in g s  -  T rade R ece ivab le  S e c u r it iz a tio n  F a c ility 200.0 200.0 200.0 200.0 200.0 200.0 199.8 199.9 200.0
Long-Te rm  D ebt 3,122.9 3,598.6 5,700.2 7,233.8 7,233.8 7,299.3 8,204.9 8,183.5 8,183.5 8,099.2 8,091.9 9,953.1
Tota l D ebt 3,138.4 3,619.1 5,731.2 K 7,473.1 7,473.1 7,538.6 8,449.1 8,427.3 8,427.3 8,342.4 8,335.3 10,205.7
Total L ia b ilit ie s 3,693.8 4,240.8 6,485.3 8,312.9 8,378.3 8,552.4 9,519.4 9,465.4 9,465.4 9,294.2 9,321.3 11,378.7
V "  N l
Sh a re h o ld e rs' Equity 819.9 1,335.3 l  (336.4) ) (1,556.1) (1,464.7) (1,326.2) (1,169.0) (1,038.3) (1,038.3) (964.3) (961.8) (808.2) .
^ ---------
L ia b ilit ie s  an d  S h are h o ld e rs' Equity 4,513.6 5,576.1 6,148.9 6,756.8 6,913.6 7,226.2 8,350.4 8,427.1 8,427.1 8,330.0 8,359.5 10,570.5
This leverage greatly magnified returns. In fact, based on our compounder playbook equation, we 
believe leverage is actually the greatest piece of return for TDG, representing ~ 15% in returns.15 Such 
high leverage not only magnifies returns but would also magnify losses in times of crisis, a dynamic we 
will discuss later under risks.
Still, the debt itself is a mix of PE style debt with no amortization and high yield bonds (~ 5.4% total cost 
of debt), with maturities out to 2020 -  2024 and ~75% of the rates locked-in or hedged out.
Aside from special dividends16 paid in 2009, 2012, 2013, and 2014, TDG doesn't pay a regular dividend. 
Even more interesting is that TDG almost never repurchases shares, opting to use leverage and excess 
cash to reinvest in the business or pursue incremental roll-ups. This changed in FY'16 after the 'frictional 
FY'15' put a damper on the stock and the firm used its 2014 share repurchase program to buy back 
shares.
And in the January of 2016, management actually increased the amount allowed under their pre-existing 
share repurchase program, quote:
"On October 22, 2014, our Board o f Directors authorized a stock repurchase program replacing 
our previous repurchase program permitting us to repurchase a portion o f our outstanding 
shares not to exceed $300 million in the aggregate. During fiscal 2016, until the $300 million 
program was replaced on January 21, 2016, the Company had repurchased 452,187 shares of its
15 This is based on the implied returns from organic and inorganic growth.
16 This amounted to ~ $3B, which is a lot for a firm with a current JEM of ~$24B. These were paid when M&A 
opportunities were lukewarm.
common stock at a gross cost o f approximately $98.7 million at the weighted-average price per 
share o f $218.23.
On January 21, 2016, our Board o f Directors authorized a stock repurchase program replacing 
the $300 million program with a repurchase program permitting us to repurchase a portion of 
our outstanding shares not to exceed $450 million in the aggregate. As o f July 2, 2016, the 
Company had repurchased 563,200 shares o f its common stock at a gross cost o f approximately 
$109.1 million at the weighted-average price per share o f $193.67 under the $450 million stock 
repurchase program. During the thirteen week period ended July 2, 2016, there were no issuer 
purchases o f its common shares outstanding."17
We think this is telling for several reasons -
• First, it tells us that management isn't afraid to repurchase shares if it's optimal to do so. This 
means even if the M&A pipeline isn't attractive.
• Second, the fact that the program was expanded and still hasn't even exceeded the original 
$300mm repurchase program, could indicate that management is cognizant of where we are in 
the cycle; and
• Three, the lack of buybacks in Q2 could be indicative that management thinks shares are 
currently expensive, or perhaps more optimistically, they think they are better served allocating 
capital elsewhere.
And while TDG does have a lot of leverage, there are two things to consider -
(a) 75% of their debt is actually fixed and not due until 2020 and beyond; and
(b) They still have ~ $400mm available to borrow for incremental M&A.18
On a high level, the combination of M&A, special dividends, and share buybacks tells us that
management isn't afraid to optimally deploy capital.
So who runs TDG? This brings us to Management.
IV. Management Team
Douglas Peacock was the co-founder of TDG and the retired CEO/Chairman.19 But today, TDG is run by 
Nicholas Howley who owns 1.49% of TDG (in other words, there is skin in the game) -
17 'TDG Q3 FY'16 10-Q," P- 37, Edgar,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1260221/000126022116000077/tdg2016a310-q.htm.
18 When combined with cash, TDG actually has ~ $1.850B for incremental acquisitions.
19 'TDG FY'16 Proxy," p. 4, Edgar,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1260221/000119312516434Q69/d30579ddefl4a.htm.
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Exercisable or 
Exercisable 
within 60 Gays
Total
Number
of
Shares
Percentage 
of Class
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Howley's compensation involves a fairly modest salary and base ($lm m  salary and $lm m  bonus per 
year). But it also heavily inclusive of option awards. These option awards are actually based on 
performance metrics that revolve around successful compounding of cash flows.
However, in order for Howley to have his options to vest, the TDG stock must achieve a 10% CAGR. Yet 
TDG also looks at the success of acquisitions, cash flow generations, and the impact of any stock dilution 
when looking at compensation.20
We also note that in certain M&A transactions, Howley's brother21 has been involved as a seller. We 
don't make any mistake on how this rubs us the wrong way, especially since:
a. Howley wasn't a founder of TDG; and
b. TDG isn't a private firm and Howley isn't majority owner.
We think so long as acquisitions are appropriate, we can overcome our hesitations. Yet we weigh this 
much higher on terms of negatives as most given our background and our general disdain for the 
investment community just becoming 'complacent' with corporate governance.
The Board is made up of Private Equity-like individuals like Robert Small (Berkshire Partners) who owns 
5.17%. These insiders aren't shy about taking advantage of when they perceive TDG to be 'cheap.'22 
These PE board members also have historically sold their portfolio companies to TDG which also rubs us
the wrong way. STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN BENEFICIAL 
OWNERSHIP
20 They also look at adjusted EBITDA figures. There is a risk to all of this too as it can promote aggressive pursuits all 
forthe sake of a 'higher' stock price.
21 This is dug up from our own diligence that we kept out of the model to give Howley and his extended family 
privacy. However, a good portion of this information can be readily dug up with some basic internet research skills.
22 'TDG Statement of Changes in Beneficiary Ownership", SEC, accessed by March 7, 2016,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1234544/000Q91957416011663/xslF345X03/small transdigm- 
03072016.xml.
The PE mindset of the board makes sense given the high degrees of leverage that TDG employs.
More interesting is that management actually leverages our playbook formula; yet we actually think the 
true 'weights' are a bit different -
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We think this general framework is a 'good' thing but we also have enough experience to recognize 
some dangers from the compensation structure as it relates to other risks alluded to earlier.
V. Valuation
Considering the compounder formula, TDG essentially can attribute ~ 7% to organic growth, 4% to 
acquisitions, and ~ 15% to leverage. All told, this amounts to ~ 28% earnings growth.23 This is actually 
close to the firm's earnings CAGR of 30.9% for the past five years.
This kind of growth naturally scares traditional value investors. Questions of sustainability of growth, 
pipeline of acquisitions, and the ability to continue to 'compound' are natural concerns.
But considering the historical growth, we definitely do apply an aggressive FCF multiple of 25x as shown 
below -
FCF Valuation 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Free Cash Flow 435.0 642.3 749.4 961.8 1,218.0
FCF/Share $8.05 $12.13 $14.39 $18.73 $24.01
FCF/share Growth 50.6% 18.7% 30.2% 28.2%
Target Forward Multiple 25.00x 25 OOx 25.OOx 25.OOx 25.OOx
Price $201.30 $303.13 $359.70 $468.25 $600.13
IRR 4.9% 11.6% 17.5% 20.0%
Yet there are three points to consider -
23 (1.07) x (1.04) x (1.15) -  1 ~ 28%.
• First, while TDG's multiple is higher than most comps, the historical FCF multiple for TDG has 
always been elevated given its moat, management, and growth profile. In fact, on average, TDG 
has traded on average around 24x to 25x FCF so we don't think we are being that unreasonable.
• Second, one way to view this is looking at how we think FCF could trend over the next 5 years. 
Our FY'16 projections are fairly modest. We note that despite the 'rough' FY'15, TDG actually 
managed to achieve $466.1mm in FCF. And TDG achieved $507.1mm in FCF in FY'14. In other 
words, our FY'16 FCF (the 'base') is lower than the past two years. If we normalize these figures 
into a FY'17 figure (the firm is on September calendar year), we get the more normalized FCF 
trend of about $642.3mm.24 In this light, we are essentially betting that FCF can 'double' in 4 
years (hence the 20% IRR). We think this is actually possible.
We think that framework of 'cash inflows and outflows' aligns with TDG's private-equity mindset and 
essentially removes the impact of the multiple. While we have a sensitivity table, we think this is a bit 
misguided considering that management has a history of beating their guidance given acquisitions.25
The quintessential question becomes one of their ability to achieve a certain level of FCF by 2020. 
Considering the management, patient capital invested, and the characteristics of the business, we don't 
think that's too difficult.
24 By normalized, we are saying if the progression of growth continued unabated from FY'14 to FY'16.
25 They are more 50-50 on GAAP metrics due to timing and frictional costs.
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